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Hospitals, according to Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2015), 
make up 5.6% of U.S. GDP. Since the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act, Schmitt (2017) reports, “there has been a sharp uptick 
in hospital mergers, with the number of deals essentially 
doubling within three years.” According to Cooper, Craig, 
Gaynor, and van Reenen (2019), merging hospitals are mostly 
large, well-respected nonprofits and “tend to be located in less 
concentrated markets” where they are less likely to draw 
antitrust scrutiny. Increased concentration likely strengthens 
hospitals’ negotiating power with insurers, resulting in higher 
rates. 
The impact of hospital concentration on municipal finances 
is not well understood. Given that hospital concentration 
increases prices for patients and hospitals receive substantial tax 
incentives, the question of whether hospitals earn their 
government assistance is a pressing one. When tax revenues 
decrease, cities must cut public services, including education, 
food assistance, and public safety. With Jonas (2012) 
calculating that city property tax revenues fell by 3.2% on 
average and by up to 25% during the Great Recession and with 
cities taking a financial hit from coronavirus-related shutdowns, 
understanding the role of one of the largest industries in the 
country and in many cities, hospitals, on municipal finances is 
important. If hospital concentration contributes to this trend, 
policymakers need to know. 
In this paper, I use a city fixed effects model to study the 
relationship between hospital concentration and taxes. I identify 
this model based on changes in hospital concentration within a 
city over time, as opposed to differences across cities. Utilizing 
panel data on hospital size from 2001 to 2014, I construct a 
measure of hospital concentration and system concentration 
within each city. With the Lincoln Institute’s fiscally 
standardized dataset on municipal finances, I measure the effect 
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Abstract 
Since adoption of the Affordable Care Act, hospital concentration has increased across the country, with alarming implications for 
healthcare affordability. This paper finds evidence that hospital concentration is associated with increases in tax revenue and 
property tax revenue per capita within a city. The relationship between hospital concentration and taxes is strongest in cities with 
higher tax revenues, with higher nonprofit ownership shares, and that financially support their hospitals. This paper investigates 
two potential mechanisms through which hospital concentration may increase tax revenues within a city—specifically, the effect 
of concentration on changes in nonprofit or for-profit hospital ownership and the effect of concentration on capital investments—
failing to find strong supporting evidence for either. Beyond hospital concentration’s role in healthcare price growth across the 
country, this paper may provide a starting point for further investigation into the impact of hospital mergers and concentration on 
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of changes in hospital concentration on tax revenue within a 
city. I then split cities above and below median tax revenues and 
median for-profit and nonprofit hospital ownership shares to 
gauge which types of cities are powering the relationship 
between hospital concentration and taxes. Finally, utilizing a 
RAND dataset containing hospital ownership shares and capital 
expenditures across markets, I explore two mechanisms through 
which hospital concentration could affect municipal finances: 
changes in ownership status after mergers and capital 
construction.  
I find evidence that growth in hospital concentration as 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) within a 
city increases municipal taxes and property taxes per capita. A 
10% increase in hospital concentration is associated with a 
moderately significant increase in taxes per capita of 1.6% 
within a city. Though statistically insignificant, a 10% increase 
in HHI corresponds to an approximately 2% increase in property 
tax revenue per capita within a city. That the property tax result 
is larger than that for all tax revenues combined suggests that 
changes in property taxes may be driving the relationship 
between hospital concentration and taxes. System concentration 
also appears to increase municipal finances. My heterogeneity 
analysis reveals that the relationship between hospital 
concentration and municipal finances is largest in cities with 
high taxes and high nonprofit ownership shares.  
Turning to mechanisms, my analyses fail to support the 
hypothesis that changes in the for-profit or nonprofit hospital 
share are responsible for the positive relationship between HHI 
and tax revenue per capita within a city. Instead, I find that only 
growth in the government-run hospital share increases tax 
revenue, which may be a case of reverse causality. Because 
cities can tax for-profit hospitals, I anticipated a positive 
relationship between the for-profit ownership share and 
property taxes per capita. Surprisingly, I find that a 10% 
increase in the share of for-profit hospitals corresponds to a 
2.3% decrease in property tax revenue, whereas the share of 
nonprofit hospitals had next to no effect on property taxes. Next, 
I analyze whether hospital construction and expansion explain 
changes in capital construction and, through construction, the 
increase in taxes per capita within cities. While my results show 
that increases in HHI statistically significantly reduce various 
measures of capital construction within cities, I identify no 
relationship between capital expenditures and tax revenue.  
My paper contributes to the literature by establishing a 
relationship, whether causal or not, between hospital 
concentration and city tax revenue. By investigating the 
repercussions of hospital concentration on city governments as 
opposed to healthcare prices, costs, and outcomes, I am 
contributing novel research to the existing literature and 
providing a starting point for future investigation.  
One limitation of my research is that because including 
fixed effects limits my analysis to variation within cities, the city 
fixed effects cannot account for time-varying characteristics 
within cities. For example, my city fixed effects model would 
not control for a shock, such as Hurricane Katrina, that affects 
one city’s taxes and economic growth and not others’. Similarly, 
city fixed effects cannot account for differences in regional 
economic development. Without supporting evidence for a 
causal pathway through which hospital concentration might 
increase tax revenue, I cannot verify causation. Another 
limitation of my study is that the RAND dataset on hospital 
capital and ownership status does not encompass all the cities in 
the Lincoln Institute data and the city definitions differ slightly, 
making comparisons across the two datasets imperfect.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Research shows that hospital consolidation raises prices on 
consumers. Applying difference-in-differences to health 
insurance claims data, Cooper et al. (2019) discovered that 
“prices increased by over 6% when the merging hospitals were 
geographically close (e.g., 5 miles or less apart), but not when 
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the hospitals were geographically distant (e.g., over 25 miles 
apart).” Alarmingly, Dafny (2009) found that non-merging 
hospitals respond to the merger of their rivals by increasing their 
own prices by up to 40%. Comparing insurer and hospital 
concentration, Melnick, Shen, and Wu (2011) determined that 
hospital concentration raises prices for consumers while insurer 
concentration lowers prices. Unfortunately for consumers, 90% 
of hospitals operate in markets wherein hospital concentration 
exceeds insurance plan concentration. Hospitals get away with 
price increases because consumers “choose hospitals largely 
ignoring the hospital’s price,” according to Garmon (2013). 
Hospitals, especially nonprofit ones, receive substantial 
government support. By exempting nonprofit hospitals from 
“federal income tax, state income 
tax, state and local sales taxes, and 
local property tax,” nonprofit 
hospitals received a subsidy of 
$24.6 billion in 2011, Rosenbaum et 
al. (2015) estimated. In response to 
calls to increase their community 
benefit spending, nonprofit 
hospitals, which make up 47% of all 
US hospitals, according to the American Hospital Association, 
raised their community benefit spending from 7.6% of operating 
expenses in 2010 to 8.1% in 2014, Young et al. (2018) 
calculated. Herring et al. (2018) found that “incremental 
community benefit spending”—how much more nonprofit 
hospitals spend on charity care and community benefit 
programs than for-profit hospitals—exceeded the tax exemption 
for only 62% of nonprofit hospitals.  
As nonprofit hospitals consolidate and raise prices, they 
continue to receive substantial tax breaks. With many 
municipalities in financial trouble thanks to coronavirus and 
critics questioning hospitals’ community benefit spending, 
understanding the effect of hospital concentration on municipal 
finances is an important policy concern. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
3.1) Hospital Merger Data 
Cooper et al.’s “The Price Ain’t Right” (2019) contains a 
hospital merger dataset with the ownership status of 2,358 out 
of 3,272 hospitals in the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
from 2001 to 2014. These publicly-available data include 
system affiliation, latitude and longitude, and hospital bed 
count. The authors’ unique location and system identifiers made 
possible the calculation of market concentration using HHI.  
3.2) Lincoln Institute Data 
Founded in 1946, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
maintains a dataset, “Fiscally 
Standardized Cities,” on the finances 
of 150 American cities from 1977 to 
2016, including tax revenues and 
expenditures. I have limited my 
analysis to the 147 cities with at least 
one hospital in the Cooper et al. 
(2019) dataset and the period 2001-
2014 to match Cooper et al.’s (2019).  
For the purposes of this paper, I 
use only 20 measures encompassing taxes, revenues, and 
spending. All values are per capita, enabling straightforward 
comparisons across cities. Because some city jurisdictions may 
overlap with county governments, the Lincoln Institute created 
fiscally standardized (FiSC) indicators by “adding together 
revenues and expenditures for the city government plus an 
appropriate share from overlying counties, school districts, and 
special districts…based on a city’s share of county population, 
the percentage of students in each school district that live in the 
central city, and the city’s share of the estimated population 
served by each special district,” according to Langley (2016). I 
will be restricting my analysis to FiSC variables to sidestep 
complications with overlapping government jurisdictions. This 
“With many municipalities in 
financial trouble thanks to 
coronavirus and critics questioning 
hospitals’ community benefit 
spending, understanding the effect 
of hospital concentration on 
municipal finances is an important 
policy concern.” 
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is a widely-accepted practice for research across cities with 
variable governmental structures. The IMF’s Jiri Jonas (2012) 
used a similar “constructed cities” method to estimate the costs 
of the Great Recession on local governments and other 
researchers, including Chernick and Reschovsky (2017), have 
used the Lincoln Institute’s dataset for papers in the Journal of 
Urban Affairs, for the Pew Charitable Trust, and for the Federal 
Reserve.  
3.3) RAND Market-Level Hospital Data 
Using CMS Medicare cost reports, the RAND Corporation 
compiled metrics on hospital profits, costs, ownership status, 
and more. RAND aggregates the data at hospital, county, 
market, and state levels. To facilitate comparisons across 
Lincoln Institute and RAND measures, I have opted for market-
level indicators. 115 markets in the RAND dataset match, 
imperfectly, cities in the Lincoln data. Unlike the Lincoln 
Institute data, RAND market indicators may not be confined to 
city limits. However, as an approximation, RAND markets and 
Lincoln cities are useful. Because the Lincoln Institute compiles 
its data on a per-capita basis, I calculated population-weighted 
averages for Lincoln Institute cities to create matching, 
aggregated “markets” in cases where RAND lists several cities 
under one market name, such as “Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Anaheim, CA.”  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1) Creating Measures of HHI and System HHI 
HHI is a measure of market concentration used in the 
academic literature and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 
antitrust cases. The DOJ considers markets with HHI scores 
between 0 and 1,500 un-concentrated, between 1,500 and 2,500 
moderately concentrated, and between 2,500 and 10,000 highly 
concentrated. This paper uses hospital beds, as compiled in 
Cooper et al. (2019), as a proxy for market share. For a given 
market with n hospitals, its HHI is the sum of each hospital’s 
market share, si, squared: 
Any measure of hospital concentration that ignores hospital 
systems is likely to understate market concentration. Thus, 
within each city, I grouped hospitals by system to calculate 
system market share. For a market with N systems,   
Using hospital system market share, I calculated system HHI  
 
4.2) City Fixed Effects Model 
To estimate the effect of hospital concentration on taxes and 
property taxes per capita, I employed a city fixed effects model 
with standard errors clustered by city and year controls. Fixed 
effects isolate the impact of a change in one indicator on another 
within a city over time, holding all other time-invariant, city 
characteristics equal:  
 
The coefficient of interest, 1, captures the effect of the 
independent variable X—the logarithm of HHI, system HHI, or 
another variable—on the dependent variable Y—the logarithm 
of a measure of municipal finances such as tax revenue per 
capita. I scaled my estimates such that the coefficient represents 
the effect of an approximately 10% change in HHI. Year fixed 
effects control for trends across time, such as overall changes in 
tax revenues across time resulting from macroeconomic events 
unrelated to hospital concentration. All standard errors are 
clustered at the city level to account for serial correlation in the 
estimates of a city over time. Results are weighted by city 
population because city populations vary from a low of 16,000 
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to more than 8,000,000 and small cities tend to have highly 
concentrated hospital sectors, distorting the results in one 
direction. 
A city fixed effects model does not inherently demonstrate 
causality but is usually more accurate than simple regressions 
across cities because it discards cross-city variation in financial 
structure. Small cities tend to have more concentrated hospital 
sectors than large cities and tax residents less. Taking an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression across small and large 
cities, therefore, is likely to find that taxes and hospital sectors 
are negatively correlated. A city fixed effects regression, by 
contrast, isolates the impact of hospital concentration on taxes 
within a city over time.  
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports my summary statistics.  
 
Most cities have highly concentrated hospital sectors, with 
a mean HHI and mean system HHI of 4,661 and 5,306, 
respectively—well above the DOJ threshold of 2,500. Because 
systems own multiple hospitals, system HHI logically exceeds 
HHI.   
5.2) Hospital Concentration and Taxes 
Table 2 displays my primary estimates of the relationship 
between HHI and taxes.  
The estimates in column 1 come from an OLS regression 
between HHI and taxes per capita across cities. Column 2 adds 
the results of a fixed effects regression between HHI and tax 
revenues per capita. Column 3 displays the estimates of the OLS 
regression between system HHI and taxes. Column 4 exhibits 
the fixed effects results of system HHI and taxes. Columns 5 
through 8 do the same for HHI and property taxes per capita.  
Although the OLS regression across cities suggests a 
negative relationship between hospital concentration (HHI) and 
taxes per capita, the fixed effects model, which examines 
variation within a city and accounts for time effects, shows a 
positive and moderately significant relationship between HHI 
5
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and taxes per capita: a 10% increase in HHI is associated with 
an approximately 1.6% increase in taxes per capita. Whereas the 
OLS regression captures that small cities tend to have 
concentrated hospital sectors and low rates of taxation, fixed 
effects indicate that an increase in hospital concentration within 
a city is associated with a decrease in taxes per capita. Similarly, 
the movement from across-city variation to within-city variation 
flips the direction of the impact of system HHI on taxes per 
capita from negative to positive.  
Though far from conclusive, the property tax results imply 
that HHI and property taxes per capita are positively correlated, 
with a 10% increase in HHI associated with a roughly 2% 
increase in property tax revenues. The correlation between 
system HHI and property taxes is slightly positive and 
statistically insignificant.  
5.3) Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
In this section, I examine which types of cities are driving 
the relationship between hospital concentration and tax 
revenues. I find that cities with higher taxes, with higher 
nonprofit ownership shares, and that support their hospitals 
financially exhibit more substantial relationships between 
hospital concentration and taxes. 
The relationship between HHI, on the one hand, and taxes 
and property taxes, on the other, is the most positive and most 
statistically significant in cities with the highest tax revenues. 
To determine which cities account for the relationship between 
HHI and taxes per capita, I take each city’s average tax revenue 
over the study period and then organize cities above and below 
the median average tax revenue over the study period. In Table 
3, I test HHI’s relationship with taxes and property taxes above 
and below the median.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 display the results of my fixed 
effects regression of HHI and taxes per capita in below-median 
and above-median taxed cities, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 
do the same for HHI and property taxes. In high-taxed cities, a 
10% increase in HHI corresponds to a statistically significant 
2% increase in taxes per capita. In cities with below-median 
taxation, the effect of HHI on taxes is slightly negative and 
statistically insignificant. Likewise, Table 3 shows that above-
median taxed cities are powering the positive relationship 
between HHI and property taxes I observe in Table 3. In high-
taxed cities, a 10% increase in HHI is associated with an 
approximately 2.6% increase in property taxes per capita. In 
less-taxed cities, HHI has no effect on taxes or property taxes. 
Treating taxes as an imperfect indicator of a city’s wealth or tax 
base—since cities with higher per capita incomes can afford to 
tax their residents more—Table 3 illustrates that hospital 
concentration has a larger impact on tax revenue in prosperous 
cities. 
In the following analyses, I investigate whether a city’s 
share of nonprofit hospitals affects my treatment effects. In 
Table 4, I start by calculating the average of each city’s 
nonprofit ownership share over the study period and then divide 
cities into subsets depending on whether they are above or 
below the median city’s for-profit share, allowing me to discern 
whether cities with higher or lower nonprofit ownership account 
for the relationship between HHI and taxes.  
Though the share of nonprofit hospitals is not the inverse of 
the share of for-profit hospitals thanks to the existence of 
government-run hospitals, the results for nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals mirror each other. Cities with a higher share of 
nonprofit hospitals exhibit a larger association between hospital 
6
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concentration and taxes. In Table 4, the relationship between 
hospital concentration and taxes is statistically insignificant 
above and below the median nonprofit ownership share. 
However, the coefficient for HHI and taxes is seemingly more 
positive in cities with above-median nonprofit ownership 
shares, with a 10% increase in HHI corresponding to a 1.5% 
increase in above-median nonprofit cities. Likewise, HHI and 
property tax revenue per capita are more positively related in 
cities with above-median nonprofit ownership shares: a 10% 
increase in HHI is associated with a roughly 3% increase in 
property tax revenue in cities with above-median nonprofit 
ownership. 
Given that cities with higher tax revenues exhibit a larger 
association between hospital concentration and taxes, the extent 
to which cities direct revenue to hospitals may reinforce the 
relationship between city finances and hospital concentration. 
To explore whether city government spending patterns affect 
this relationship, I split cities in Table 5 by whether or not they 
have ever supported their hospitals financially through direct 
hospital payments.  
  
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 display my estimates for the 
relationship between HHI and measures of tax revenue for the 
91 cities that financially supported their hospitals between 2001 
and 2014. Columns 2 and 4 contain estimates for the 56 cities 
that never supported their hospitals. In cities that have supported 
their hospitals financially, a 10% increase in HHI is associated 
with a moderately significant 1.7% increase in taxes and a 
statistically insignificant 2% increase in property taxes. The 
relationship between HHI and taxes per capita in cities that have 
never supported their hospitals financially is both statistically 
insignificant and less positive, with a 10% increase in HHI 
resulting in a statistically insignificant 1% increase in taxes and 
a statistically significant 1.1% increase in property taxes. Thus, 
the relationship between HHI and tax revenues appears largest 
in cities that have supported their hospitals financially than 
within those that have not. 
These results reveal that the effect of HHI on taxes and 
property taxes is stronger in some cities than in others. In cities 
with higher tax revenues per capita, my results point to a 
statistically significant, positive relationship between HHI, on 
one side, and taxes and property taxes, on the other. In cities 
with a higher nonprofit hospital share and lower for-profit 
hospital ownership share, HHI and tax revenues are more 
positively related. Finally, in cities that support their hospitals 
financially, the relationship between HHI and tax revenues is 
more positive.  
These findings are likely interdependent since cities with 
lower for-profit shares also tend to have higher taxes, the OLS 
results in Tables 6 and 7 show. Cities with higher tax revenues 
are more likely to spend across a wide variety of items, 
including direct payments to hospitals. That the relationship 
between hospital concentration and municipal finances is 
strongest in cities with higher taxes, lower for-profit shares, and 
higher spending on hospitals may stem from these cities having 
more mechanisms through which hospital concentration can 
affect municipal finances. In a city with low tax revenues and 
low spending, it is possible that any change in the relative 
concentration of that city’s hospital sector is less likely to 
influence its finances because the city lacks the mechanisms, 
including direct hospital payments, to register such a change.  
7
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5.4) Mechanisms 
In this section, I attempt to identify a mechanism through 
which hospital concentration impacts city taxes. The two 
mechanisms I explore are: (1) changes in the share of for-profit, 
nonprofit, or government hospitals and (2) changes in hospitals’ 
capital expenditures. For the first, it is possible that growth in 
the for-profit hospital share could increase tax revenues since 
cities can tax for-profit hospitals. For the second, growth in 
hospitals’ capital expenditures could signal that hospitals are 
purchasing land or building new facilities, which could alter a 
city’s property tax base. If a nonprofit hospital buys land, for 
example, a city’s property tax base would contract because it 
cannot tax land owned by nonprofits. Since 30% of cities’ tax 
revenues come from property taxes in 2017, according to the 
Tax Policy Center, any change, including hospital ownership 
status, that affects a city’s property tax base could have a 
measurable impact on its revenue generation. I fail to find 
supporting evidence for either mechanism. Only the 
government hospital share has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on taxes, while the shares of nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals have negligible impacts. Instead of finding an 
association between capital expenditures and tax revenues, my 
estimates imply that capital expenditures correspond to a 
decrease in hospital concentration and are not significantly 
related to tax revenue.  
Because nonprofit hospitals are exempt from property 
taxes, it is worth exploring whether growth in the nonprofit 
hospital sector impacts municipal finances. To do this, I run city 
fixed effects regressions of RAND’s measures of nonprofit, for-
profit, and government ownership on tax data taken from the 
Lincoln Institute in Table 6.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 present results from an OLS 
and a city fixed effects regression, respectively, of nonprofit 
ownership share on tax revenue per capita. Columns 3 and 4 do 
the same for the share of for-profit hospitals on taxes. Columns 
5 and 6 add the results of the relationship between government-
run hospitals and taxes. Growth in the nonprofit or for-profit 
market share has a negligible impact on tax revenue. Only the 
share of government-run hospitals is statistically significantly 
associated with tax revenue per capita: a 10% increase in the 
government share corresponds to an approximately 2.2% 
increase in tax revenues within a city. This may be a case of 
reverse causality, though: to operate government-run hospital 
systems, governments need more revenue. 
Because nonprofit hospitals are exempt from property 
taxes, it is possible that nonprofit and for-profit consolidation 
have divergent effects on property tax revenue. Hence, the 
negative coefficient of for-profit hospital ownership on property 
taxes is surprising.   
8
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As Table 7 illustrates, growth in the market share of for-
profit hospitals within a city is associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in property taxes per capita. I found that a 
10% increase in the for-profit share corresponds to a decrease in 
property taxes of roughly 2.3%. Because cities can tax land 
owned by for-profit hospitals, growth in the for-profit share may 
expand a city’s property tax base. With a broader tax base, a 
city’s tax burden may be spread more evenly across the 
population, possibly resulting in lower property taxes per capita. 
Growth in the nonprofit share of hospitals within a city has 
virtually no impact on property tax revenues. A 10% increase in 
the government ownership share, by contrast, increases property 
tax revenue by approximately 4.2%, a result that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This, too, is likely a case of reverse 
causality: to fund government hospital systems, cities need 
higher property taxes. It is worth noting that growth in the for-
profit hospital share has a significantly more negative effect on 
property tax revenues than does an increase in the nonprofit 
hospital share.  
Additionally, with the RAND dataset, I examined whether 
HHI affected capital expenditures, which could suggest that 
consolidation breeds construction. I next checked whether 
increases in capital expenditures within a city impacted tax 
revenues. If hospital concentration were expanding construction 
and construction were then raising tax revenues by increasing 
property values or incomes, then I could identify a possible 
causal mechanism.   
On the first count, Table 8 shows that HHI is associated 
with reductions in hospital capital, a combination of capital-
related buildings and fixtures, total fixed assets, and capital-
related costs.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 feature OLS and fixed effects 
regression results of HHI on measures of hospital capital. 
Columns 3 and 4 do the same for system HHI and measures of 
capital. As the fixed effects results in Table 8 illustrate, a 10% 
increase in HHI within a city corresponds to a significant 8.3% 
9
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decrease in various measures of capital. Likewise, increases in 
system consolidation appear to be weakly associated with 
falling capital costs within a city. 
When I separate these measures of capital in Table 9, I also 
find that HHI reduces capital costs and expenditures.  
With a statistical significance of less than 1%, a 10% 
increase in HHI is associated with a 4% decrease in capital-
related costs. Though statistically insignificant, growth in 
system HHI also appears to reduce capital-related costs. 
Together, Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate that HHI has a 
significantly negative impact on capital expenditures and costs.  
On the second count, however, Table 10 identifies no 
significant relationship between various measures of capital 
expenditures and taxes or property taxes.   
The estimates in columns 1 and 2 come from OLS and fixed 
effects regressions, respectively, of measures of capital costs 
and expenditures and taxes per capita. Columns 3 and 4 do the 
same for capital measures on property taxes. None of the 
estimates is large or statistically significant.  
To further investigate whether changes in capital 
expenditures act as a causal mechanism for hospital 
concentration to affect taxes and property taxes, I add capital 
controls—the logarithms of capital-related buildings and 
fixtures, capital-related costs, and total fixed assets—to my 
fixed effects regression, in Table 11. Because only the RAND 
dataset contains measures of capital, the results in Table 11 are 
not directly comparable to those in Table 2 based on the Lincoln 
data.  
Columns 1 and 2 display the results of fixed effects 
regressions of HHI on taxes per capita without and with capital 
controls, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 add the results for 
property taxes without and with capital controls. Unlike Table 
2, I find no statistically significant relationship between HHI 
and taxes or property taxes in Table 11. However, like my 
previous results, Table 11 highlights a positive, though 
statistically insignificant, relationship between HHI and the two 
measures of tax revenue. More importantly, adding capital 
controls hardly budges my fixed effects results and standard 
errors, signaling that changes in capital expenditures do not 
explain the positive association between hospital concentration 
and taxes.  
Although I was unable to conclusively identify a 
mechanism to explain the positive relationship between HHI 
and taxes per capita, I can rule out two hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis which my analysis could not corroborate was that 
hospital ownership status was responsible for the positive 
relationship between hospital concentration and tax revenues 
within a city. The second hypothesis that we can discard is that, 
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as hospitals invested in making improvements and purchased 
more real estate, they drove up property values and thereby 
increased property tax revenues. Instead, I found no significant 
relationship between various measures of capital construction 
and tax revenues. Simultaneously, I found a significantly 
negative relationship between hospital concentration and capital 
costs, indicating that increases in HHI may stem from closing 
competitor hospitals, which would decrease the footprint of 
hospitals in a city, or that hospitals, contrary to industry claims, 
invest less on capital improvements in the wake of 
consolidation. Future research might untangle through which 




Using city fixed effects regressions on hospitals and 
municipal finances in 147 American cities from 2001 to 2014 
and controlling for time effects, I found a statistically significant 
relationship between hospital concentration and tax revenues 
per capita within cities. A 10% increase in hospital 
concentration was associated with an approximately 1.6% 
increase in tax revenues per capita within a city. Although 
statistically insignificant, HHI and property tax revenue per 
capita appear to be positively correlated, with a 10% increase in 
HHI associated with a 2% increase in property tax revenue per 
capita.  
Since adoption of the Affordable Care Act, hospital systems 
have driven the nationwide trend in hospital consolidation, 
according to Cooper et al. (2019). Nevertheless, compared to the 
relationship between HHI and taxes, that between system HHI 
and taxes within cities over time is weak. With a correlation of 
0.93, HHI and system HHI are similar variables. Whereas HHI 
measures market concentration across individual hospitals 
within a city, system HHI measures market concentration across 
hospital systems within a city. That HHI has a stronger 
relationship with taxes than system HHI may be a sign that 
growth in hospital size as measured by beds, not hospital system 
consolidation, is responsible for the association between 
hospital concentration and municipal finances.  
Through my heterogeneous treatment effects analysis, I 
determined that cities with higher tax bases and those that 
supported their hospitals financially exhibited stronger positive 
relationships between hospital concentration and tax revenues 
per capita, reinforcing the idea that cities with higher taxes and 
cities that spend on a broader scale are more likely to register 
changes in hospital concentration than those with low taxes and 
low spending.  
My investigation of two possible mechanisms through which 
hospital concentration could impact municipal tax revenues—
first, changes in ownership status and, second, changes in 
capital costs and expenditures—came up empty. Lacking 
concrete evidence of a mechanism, I am reluctant to declare 
that hospital concentration causes tax revenues per capita to 
increase within a city. However, my results suggest that 
changes in tax revenue are associated with changes in hospital 
consolidation within a city. Future research should investigate 
possible mechanisms for the relationship between hospital 
concentration and taxes, potentially confirming a causal 
relationship, and investigate why hospital concentration 
correlates to reductions in capital costs and expenditures.  
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